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Background: Questions about the impact of large donor-funded HIV interventions on low- and middle-income
countries’ health systems have been the subject of a number of expert commentaries, but comparatively few empirical
research studies. Aimed at addressing a particular evidence gap vis-à-vis the influence of HIV service scale-up on
micro-level health systems, this article examines the impact of HIV scale-up on mechanisms of accountability in
Zambian primary health facilities.
Methods: Guided by the Mechanisms of Effect framework and Brinkerhoff’s work on accountability, we conducted
an in-depth multi-case study to examine how HIV services influenced mechanisms of administrative and social
accountability in four Zambian primary health centres. Sites were selected for established (over 3 yrs) antiretroviral
therapy (ART) services and urban, peri-urban and rural characteristics. Case data included provider interviews (60);
patient interviews (180); direct observation of facility operations (2 wks/centre) and key informant interviews (14).
Results: Resource-intensive investment in HIV services contributed to some early gains in administrative answerability
within the four ART departments, helping to establish the material capabilities necessary to deliver and monitor service
delivery. Simultaneous investment in external supervision and professional development helped to promote
transparency around individual and team performance and also strengthened positive work norms in the ART
departments. In the wider health centres, however, mechanisms of administrative accountability remained weak,
hindered by poor data collection and under capacitated leadership. Substantive gains in social accountability were also
elusive as HIV scale-up did little to address deeply rooted information and power asymmetries in the wider facilities.
Conclusions: Short terms gains in primary-level service accountability may arise from investment in health system
hardware. However, sustained improvements in service quality and responsiveness arising from genuine improvements
in social and administrative accountability require greater understanding of, and investment in changing, the power
relations, work norms, leadership and disciplinary mechanisms that shape these micro-level health systems.
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Between 1996 and 2008 global funding for HIV increased
from US$300 million to an estimated US$15.6 billion [1].
A large proportion of this funding was directed towards a
handful of countries in sub-Saharan Africa where HIV/
AIDS was a major health, social and economic threat [2].
Justified in part by the emergency status of the epidemic,
the exceptional levels of funding and rapidity of treatment
services scale-up nonetheless spurred debate regarding the
impact of disease-specific programs on recipient countries’
health systems [2-10]. Central to this debate was the ques-
tion of whether such intense focus on a single disease
could be harmful to the overall development of health sys-
tems in low- and middle-income settings.
Questions about the functions of, and interactions be-
tween, donor-funded HIV interventions and national health
systems have been the subject of a number of expert com-
mentaries, but comparatively few empirical research studies
[9]. Amongst those studies that have focused on these is-
sues, moreover, [11-14], critics have noted a bias towards
national-level assessments, as well as a tendency to focus on
measurement of effect. Far less research has been conducted
to examine the mechanisms of effect (where found), that is,
how and why HIV scale-up impacted on local health systems
[9,15,16], although there are some notable exceptions
[17-21]. The lack of empiric evidence in relation to these
issues is concerning given the continued scale-up of anti-
retroviral therapy (ART) and the transformation of HIV into
a chronic disease, which are placing increasing pressure on
weak primary level health services [22,23].
The study reported here formed part of a larger research
project that aimed to address the evidence gap vis-à-vis
the influence of HIV service scale-up on Zambian primary
health centres. An initial objective of the larger study was
to produce theoretically informed insights relating to the
mechanisms driving health centre performance. Previously
reported findings pertaining to this objective [24] point to
the critical role of mechanisms of accountability, amongst
others (e.g. mechanisms of trust), in determining primary-
level service quality and responsiveness.
The explicit focus of this article is to examine whether
and how the establishment and scale-up of HIV services in-
fluenced mechanisms of accountability within the primary
service domain, and, as a result, service quality and respon-
siveness. We then apply these findings to a consideration of
whether there is merit in attempting to design disease-
specific interventions that reflect the complexity in primary-
level services, and, in the process, enable a more contextually
comprehensive approach to the design and implementation
of health system strengthening interventions.
Study setting
The national HIV care and treatment program of the
Government of the Republic of Zambia (GRZ) progressedin several distinct stages from the early 2000s. Between
2001–2003 a hospital-based HIV treatment program
financed by government and patient co-payments was
piloted [25]. In 2003, a radical policy shift introduced by
then President Levy Mwanawasa promised free and univer-
sal access to ART, primarily supported by the (United States
government-funded) President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS
Relief (PEPFAR) and the (multi-lateral) Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (GFATM) [26]. As in
many sub-Saharan nations with generalized epidemics, the
early emphasis of HIV service rollout in Zambia was now
placed on speedy implementation, justifying (at least ini-
tially) the bypassing of what some perceived to be weak or
inefficient systems [25]. Between 2003 and 2010, scale-up
was overseen by the Ministry of Health (MOH) but exe-
cuted primarily by PEPFAR implementing partners, namely,
non-government sub-contractors tasked with establishing
and supporting (both materially and technically) HIV treat-
ment services in government primary health facilities [27].
During this period, HIV services expanded from just two
hospital-based treatment centres to encompass prevention
of mother to child transmission (PMTCT) in some 1450
government primary health centres and health posts, and
full ART services in over 150 health centres [28].
In 2010, PEPFAR implementing partners everywhere came
under pressure from prime grantees and US agencies to
harmonize the ‘vertical’ HIV services with the structures of
the local health system [29]. In Zambia, as a result, direct
salary support in the form of the ‘over time’ or ‘part time’
payments for providers working in ‘ART clinics’ was phased
out and the money reallocated to capacity building activities
such as additional clinical training and training of future
trainers [25]. From 2011, as part of the same process, local
non-government implementing partners were required to
transition responsibility for some support activities (e.g. qual-
ity assurance checks, administrative support roles) to District
and Provincial health offices. Funds previously channelled to
these partners were now redirected to government institu-
tions taking a greater role in (non-wage) support and tech-
nical assistance. According to officials from partner agencies
and the Ministry of Health, this transition received consider-
able attention during the central planning stages, but was
poorly managed on the grounda [25,30,31]. The period of
2011–2012 saw a marked decline in direct material and
technical support to primary level health centres, particularly
in the large urban health centres that were each supporting
HIV patient loads of between 3000 and 15,000 individuals.
Study design
Conceptual framework
This study and the larger project are situated in the field of
health policy and systems research (HPSR) and were guided
by insights from an emerging body of literature on the
social and adaptive nature of health systems [32,33] and
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vices [17,34-36]. In particular this study was guided by the
Mechanisms of Effect framework (see [24]), which extended
earlier theories by Sheikh et al. [37] suggesting that health
system performance is a product of interactions between
system ‘hardware’ (tangible components such as infrastruc-
ture, drugs, and human resources) and system ‘software’
(intangible components such as human values, power dy-
namics and norms). The adaptation posits (a) that the
quality and responsiveness of front-line services are
largely determined by mechanisms of accountability and
trust, and (b) that it is these mechanisms that are the
product of hardware-software interactions (see Figure 1).
Recognising that social adaptive systems are shaped in
part by feedback loops, this framework further suggests
that accountability and trust (or their absence) may also
become defining properties of the system as a whole.b
For this study we sought to refine our exploration of
the impact of HIV services on accountabilityc and so
conducted a scoping review of health services and ac-
countability literature to identify key themes of focus.
The review suggested that administrative and social ac-
countability were of most relevance for explorations of
front-line, clinic-based health services [38-43]. Adminis-
trative accountability (elsewhere called bureaucratic orFigure 1 Mechanisms of effect: a framework for micro health systemspolitical accountability) is defined as healthcare providers’
sense of accountability to their managers in relation to
clinical guidelines and pre-defined performance standards.
Social accountability is defined as providers’ accountability
to their clients (and broader community) in relation to the
needs and expectations of these groups.
Our examination of social and administrative account-
ability was informed by Chandler and Plano’s definition of
accountability as ‘a condition in which individuals who
exercise power are constrained by external means and
internal norms’ [44]. This definition is significant in a
number of respects. First, it points out that accountability
is relevant to all individuals who exercise power, not only
those who occupy formal positions of authority or those
exercising legal/rational power. In the micro-health system
setting this suggests that all actors (not just health centre
managers or doctors) must be accountable. Second, this
definition highlights the fact that accountability is not
only achieved through ‘external means’ – indicating
policies, rules, guidelines and other formal means – but
also through ‘internal norms’ and self-policing. In the
health centre setting, these internal norms might include
perceptions of responsibility for delivering high quality
services, a sense of obligation to the patients, or a strong
work ethic. Third, the definition suggests (implicitly) thatanalysis.
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generate accountability and that the constraint of power
via only one or the other is likely to be insufficient.
In developing a typology of accountability we additionally
drew on Brinkerhoff ’s characterisation of accountability
[39,45] as the product of effective mechanisms of answer-
ability and of enforceability. Answerability implies the abil-
ity of a supervisor, official or client to obtain information
about what is happening and why it is happening in a cer-
tain way. Enforceability refers to the ability of a supervisor
official or client(s) to demand certain formal or informal
standards be met and to seek redress if they are not.
Figure 2 provides the typology of accountability adopted
in this study, illustrating the domains of administrative
and social accountability and examples of mechanisms of
answerability and enforceability (representing both exter-
nal means and internal norms) common to primary level
services in low and middle income countries (LMIC).
Methods
The overall aim of the study reported here was to under-
stand whether and how the establishment and scale-up
of HIV services influenced mechanisms of accountability.
Specific objectives that guided our exploration included:
to describe how the introduction of HIV care and treat-
ment services influenced the organisation of resourcesFigure 2 Mechanisms of administrative and social accountability in aand actors in each health centre; to describe whether,
and in what ways, health centre components interacted
to produce differing levels of accountability; and to ex-
plore the ways in which introduction of HIV care and
treatment services influenced the interaction between
system components, and, subsequently, the production
of accountability (social or administrative) in this setting.
A full description of the study design and data collection
methods used in this and the larger research project has
been published previously [24]. Briefly, we adopted a
multi-case study design using a theoretical replication
strategy [45]. Case ‘units’ – four primary health centres
located in two adjacent Districts, one urban one rural –
were selected by the lead investigator (SMT) in consult-
ation with District Medical Officers, and based on both
empiric and anecdotal evidence of characteristics that
enabled exploration of patterns of service delivery. Such
characteristics included: average patient attendance data;
vaccination coverage rates; and District officers’ descrip-
tions of health centre performance. Data were collected
between June and December 2011. Methods used at each
case site included: in-depth interviews with a proportion-
ate sample of healthcare workers from various levels
(n = 60); semi-structured interviews with a quasi-random
sample of patients (n = 180); review of health centre paper-
based registers; and direct observation of facility operationshealth centre setting.
Topp et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:67 Page 5 of 14spanning at least two weeks in each centre. Observation
was both structured and semi-structured, and included the
National Healthcare Standards Assessment tool for Zambian
Health Facilities, and note-taking to record informal discus-
sions and interactions during the period of residence. In
addition, key informant interviews were held with govern-
ment and non-government officials (n = 14) with specific
knowledge or experience of the processes of HIV service
scale-up.
Data for this study are primarily drawn from interviews
with providers and patients and direct observations in the
four health centres, although interviews with key infor-
mants including District officials and NGO were also
used. During all interviews (patient, provider and key
informants), respondents were asked a range of questions
exploring the formal and informal relationships, processes
and structures that influenced their own and others’
decision making and actions in the health centre. Analysis
was carried out in three phases. Phase one, conducted
concurrently with data collection, comprised collated
notes and summaries of evidence for each health centre.
In phase two, transcribed interviews were imported into
NVivo QSR™ for electronic coding, and data were
organised to produce a case description for each health
centre [46] built around four major themes. These were: i)
providers’ role in the health centre, their typical routine,
and their position in relation to others in the facility; ii)
challenges faced in day-to-day work; iii) perceptions of the
work patterns and work culture in the facility, including
relationships with colleagues and health centre managers;
and iv) understanding of, and attitudes towards, the
introduction of HIV services. Phase three involved a
subsequent round of coding which focused on identifying
how the different domains (administrative and social) and
mechanisms (answerability and enforceability) of account-
ability were influenced by the new HIV services in each
and across the four facilities. Deductive analysis was
guided by codes developed from the Mechanisms of Effect
(Figure 1) and Accountability (Figure 2) frameworks
respectively, while inductive coding was used to incorpor-
ate new or emergent themes. Coded text and anonymised
sources were collated in a word-processor document and
printed, after which we synthesised evidence of the impact
of HIV service establishment on mechanisms of social and
administrative accountability. Negative case analysis was
conducted through the identification of experiences or
interactions that appeared to contradict our theoretical
assumptions.
Written informed consent was obtained from all
respondents for formal observations or interviews. The
study received ethical clearance from the Human Research
Ethics Committee (HREC) of the University of Melbourne
(REF#:1035194) and the University of Zambia Biomedical
Research Ethics Committee (REF#: 004-03-011).Results
Findings are presented in two sections, (1) the key charac-
teristics of the process of HIV service establishment and
scale-up in study sites and (2) analysis of the influence of
this process on administrative and social accountability
within and across the sites. We use the terms ‘health
worker’ and ‘provider’ interchangeably to refer to any indi-
vidual employed by the Ministry of Health and working in
a public health facility.
Key characteristics of HIV service establishment and
scale-up
Table 1 outlines key characteristics of the four health
centres. In each centre HIV services were established as
stand-alone ‘ART clinics’; this occurred during 2006 in
Health Centre 1 (HC1), 2009 in Health Centre 2 (HC2),
2005 in Health Centre 3 (HC3) and 2007 in Health Centre
4 (HC4). While ART clinics were located within existing
health centre grounds, almost all material and technical
support was initially delivered by PEPFAR-funded non-
government implementing partners.
As summarised in Table 1, key components of the
establishment phase of ART clinics included: training
and appointment of a new departmental ‘ART in-charge’
within each facility (all sites); substantial investment in
new or renovated infrastructure (HC1, HC3, HC4);
clinical training for select staff (all sites); recruitment of
lay health workers to carry out essential non-clinical
duties including patient education and information dis-
semination (all sites); establishment of an HIV-specific
electronic medical record system (HC1, HC3, HC4); a
HIV-specific supply chain for antiretroviral drugs and
other commodities (all sites); and the provision of non-
government partner-assisted quality assurance and
quality improvement support (all sites). Additionally, in
order to overcome chronic staff shortages, in the three
urban health centres (HC1, HC3, HC4) ‘overtime’ pay-
ments were provided to existing healthcare workers to
work extra shifts in the new ART clinics. In-service
training in HIV medicine was paid for and delivered by
non-government implementing partners with accredit-
ation provided by the Ministry of Health. Critically,
however, early involvement by District Health Manage-
ment Teams in HIV service implementation or oversight
remained limited [25].
The scale-up and transition phase saw some shifts in
activities and support for HIV services. In three facilities,
in-service training for professional staff was extended to
include more nurses and clinical officers (HC1, HC3,
HC4). However, cuts in funding for direct salary support
meant that HC2 and HC3 both lost lay registry and
counselling staff. This period also saw a removal of the
donor-funded overtime payments in HC1, HC3 and HC4
and, in an effort to move responsibility for oversight to
Table 1 Health centre demographic information & features of HIV service scale up
Demographic features Health centre 1 Health centre 2 Health centre 3 Health centre 4
Designation Urban Rural Urban Peri-Urban
Official catchment
population*
62,579 15,000 101,972 43,850
Official opening hours* Day: 8:00–17:00 Day: 8:00–17:00 Day: 8:00–17:00 Day: 8:00–17:00
Night: 17.30–7.30 Night: 17.30–7.30 Night: 17.30–7.30 Night: 17.30–7.30
Service departments** OPD, MCH,TB, ART, LAB, EH OPD, MCH,TB, ART, IPD, LAB,
LABOUR, EH
OPD, MCH,TB, ART, LAB, EH OPD, MCH,TB, ART, IPD,
LAB, LABOUR, EH
Professional staff* 41 5 46 22
Lay staff*^ 29 5 46 12
Common features of
ART clinic establishment
(c. 2005–2008)
• New stand-alone building for ART clinic in three sites (HC1, HC3, HC4)
• Externally funded/supported supply chain & laboratory services
• Recruitment & training of adult & peadiatric peer educators/Establishment
of peer support groups
• NGO funded/run in-service training for select professional staff
• Donor-funded ‘overtime’ payments for professional staff working in the ART clinics
• NGO supported quality assurance systems
• Electronic medical records in three sites (HC1, HC3, HC4); ART specific stationary at all sites.
Common features of
ART clinic scale-up
& transition (c. 2009–2011)
• Removal of donor-funded overtime payments
• Scale up of MoH-run HIV in-service training for all professional staff
• Formal inclusion of ART clinic services in routine duties of all professional staff
• Scale-back in NGO support for lay personnel (including peer educators & defaulter tracing)
• Scale-back in NGO support for quality assurance programs
• Externally funded but MOH managed ART supply chain
Common effects of ART
clinic on facility operations
& relationships
• Improved infrastructure & technical capacity to deliver ART.
• Early improvements in HCW motivation and clinical standards in ART department.
• Lay personnel enabled efficient administrative & non-clinical functions in ART department.
• Early intra-cadre jealousies around opportunities for HIV training, overtime payments and better
work conditions in ART clinics.
• Additional fragmentation (stand-alone ART clinics) of health centre management & operations.
• Strong perception amongst providers that HIV services were exceptional to their core duties (especially HC1, HC2, HC3).
• Perceptions that HIV services constituted additional/over work, undermining staff morale and service values.
Particular effects of ART
clinic on facility operations
& relationships
Enduring intra-cadre jealousies
around overtime payments
& superior work conditions
in stand-alone ART clinic
continued to undermine
provider cooperation &
continuity of care between
ART clinic and other
departments.
Small cadre of professional
staff frequently overwhelmed
by requirements of additional
HIV services. Effects exacerbated
by weaker supervision & quality
assurance afforded to rural
(as opposed
to urban) sites.
Very large patient numbers
& decreasing NGO support
for lay personnel in scale-
up phase led to marked
decline in administrative
functionality (e.g. missing
files; queue bunching) and
frequent patient-provider
confrontations.
Overall in-charge able
to use early gains in
performance standards &
staff morale in ART clinic
to strengthen overall
operations via whole-of-
clinic meetings/integrated
OPD/ART service delivery
as levers.
*At the time of study.
**OPD = Outpatient Department; MCH =Maternal and Child Health department; TB = Tuberculosis treatment department; ART = antiretroviral therapy clinic;
LAB = laboratory; EH = Environmental Health department; IPD = Inpatient Department; LABOUR = labour ward.
^Includes paid or stipendiary lay staff with a formal terms of reference; does not include ad hoc voluntary lay staff.
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assurance programs run by non-government implement-
ing partners. At the time of study, quality assurance visits
to all four sites had become increasingly ad hoc, compared
to the nearly weekly visits that had taken place between
2006 and 2009.Administrative accountability
Mechanisms of administrative answerability and enforce-
ability should help to make transparent and justify the na-
ture of individual or team performance as well as enable
rewards or sanctions for that performance. In Zambian
primary health centres, as outlined in Figure 2, mechanisms
Topp et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:67 Page 7 of 14of administrative answerability included documentation
of service activities in medical records, hard-copy regis-
ters and tally sheets, production of summary activity re-
ports and performance review and feedback by District
administrators. Mechanisms of administrative enforce-
ability were more limited, but included public sector dis-
ciplinary processes and horizontal staff transfers as well as
the work norms that shaped health worker attitudes and
work patterns.
Initial improvements in administrative answerability in the
ART clinics
Administrative answerability in the ART clinics of all
four health centres was initially strengthened via the
considerable investment in health system ‘hardware’ as
described in the previous section. Improved infrastruc-
ture, guaranteed drugs and other medical commodities,
training for professional staff and the recruitment of
new lay personnel all ensured the clinics had material
capabilities necessary to deliver HIV care and treatment
according to Ministry of Health issued guidelines.
With ART we received the big building; and supplies
and drugs. We had support. Even the Peer Educators
[were recruited and introduced]. Nurse, HC1.
Just as importantly, providers’ ability to collect and dis-
seminate information to demonstrate strong performance
was improved (Figure 3). Introduction of a more rigorous
HIV health information system, including in three sites
(HC1, HC3, HC4) an electronic medical record system, fa-
cilitated more accurate and timely documentation of pa-
tient and service data. This in turn was used in quality
assurance reports and performance reviews, making
routine assessment easier and more transparent.
Initial improvements in (internal) enforceability in the ART
clinics
During the establishment phase, work norms (internal
mechanisms of administrative enforceability) were also im-
proved amongst the teams of professional staff working in
the ART clinics. Professional development in the form of
health worker training and workshops, in combination
with NGO supervision and quality assurance support for
HIV services, had a demonstrable effect on providers’ atti-
tudes and service motivation.
Traditionally, [health workers] had the knowledge they
accrued in school, but that was it. They started
working and then there were no updates. The morale
was down and the culture was to do what you always
do, whether it’s right or wrong […]. But when the ART
clinics were introduced, we saw updates coming in,
in-house meetings, and clinical meetings. And thatchanged the culture quite a lot. The older culture was:
“I know I do this, I will do it this way because I have
been doing it this way forever.” So change was very
hard. But with ART clinics came support and mentorship.
And also there was that exchange of skills. It had a huge
impact. In-Charge, HC4.
In the three urban/peri-urban sites (HC1, HC3,
HC4), overtime payments were also described as a
powerful, albeit short-term, mechanism of enforceabil-
ity, as a material incentive as well as a more symbolic
form of motivation.
Receiving those payments I felt that I was being
appreciated for doing my job well. We were
given what we needed, and we were supported.
Nurse, HC4.In the ART clinics they have been [paid and therefore]
motivated. So there is teamwork and they care for the
patients; In-Charge, HC1.
Weakening of mechanisms of accountability in the ART
clinics over time
Early gains in administrative answerability and enforce-
ability in the four ART clinics were not sustained over
time. Key structural factors contributing to increasing lax-
ity in ART clinic performance included increasing patient
numbers (without comparable increases in health care
workers) and a decline in direct salary support for some
lay personnel (e.g. peer educators and data entry clerks)
during the transition phase. These changes were related to
macro-level decisions regarding donor funding rather than
micro-level processes. As part of a broader program of
transition, for example, implementing partners were re-
quired to cut back on direct support for various lay cadres
including data associates, registry clerks and peer educa-
tors. Finances for these cadres were re-directed through
Provincial offices, but re-hire was delayed for various rea-
sons including lack of Ministry-approved ‘establishment’
positions. At the clinic level, reductions in the number of
filing clerks, peers and data associates had significant ram-
ifications for ART service quality, interacting with broader
quality determinants (e.g. weak supervision and chronic
staff shortages) to affect almost every step of the care
pathway including:
 Longer registration queues due to lack of staff to
find paper medical records.
 Reduction in the time dedicated by peer educators
to group patient education and individual adherence
counselling.
 Insufficient support staff to transport files around
the clinic, resulting in bottlenecks and lost files.
Figure 3 Impact of HIV scale-up on mechanisms of administrative and social accountability.
Topp et al. BMC Health Services Research  (2015) 15:67 Page 8 of 14 Large backlogs of paper files awaiting electronic data
entry – creating storage, filing and queue management
problems as well as data quality problems.
 Long queues increasing tension amongst patients
and encouraging clinicians to take shortcuts to
‘clear the queue’.
The cessation of ART overtime payments during the
transition period was another key factor, effectively remov-
ing the only formal mechanism of enforceability associated
with ART service performance. Removal of overtime
payments also revealed a now established perception
among health workers that HIV services were additional
to, not a part of, their core duties, making the new MOH
policy stipulating HIV service delivery be part of routine
duties difficult to enforce.
Now that motivation [payment] has been taken away
why should I work in the ART clinic? It is extra. No,
I will just do my job. Clinician, HC3.I used to work in the HIV department. But now, I can’t.
There is unfairness in the working hours. I was told to be
working long hours [in the ART clinic] with no incentive.
So I tabled it with the sister in-charge and asked for
a departmental transfer. Nurse, HC1.In two sites (HC1, HC3), overall in-charges even reported
instances of staff boycotting the ARTclinic as a result of this
policy shift.
Now, because there are no payments, [the staff] from
ART clinic are saying: “No, I can’t even work. You
want me to work for free!” So now it is different.
Overall In-Charge, HC1.
Limited gains for administrative accountability in the wider
health centres
As can be seen in Figure 3, investment in HIV services also
had comparatively few positive flow-on effects in non-HIV
departments. Mechanisms of administrative answerability
in the broader health centres, including summary service
reports and performance reviews in non-HIV departments,
generally remained unchanged by the establishment of the
ART clinics. Nor did the new services have a positive
effect on mechanisms of enforceability in the wider health
centres, with the sanctions available to in-charges (e.g.
formal disciplinary action or intra and inter clinic transfers)
still cumbersome and largely ineffective.
Provider work norms in non-HIV departments were also
unchanged by the nascent cultural shift taking place in the
ART clinics. In HC1, HC3 and HC4, tensions around the
inequitable service conditions of providers working in ART
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with which many other providers went about their work.
This had particular ramifications for internal referrals and
continuity of care.
They used to say of us [ART staff]: “you are highly paid,
highly looked after”. They looked at the environment
in which we were working in the ART clinic and said
we were better off. Nurse, HC1.
That tension influenced our work because we saw
[staff members] saying: “as long as you are a HIV
patient, we [in OPD] will not attend you. Let those
other health workers [in the ART clinic] attend to you,
since they are trained and paid extra.” Clinician, HC3.
Nor did investment in establishing the ART clinics
improve the strategic leadership capacity of departmental
and overall in-charges. Rather, the stand alone nature of the
ART clinics, complete with external supervision and NGO-
led quality assurance mechanisms, resulted in several in-
charges explaining how they had paid little attention to the
ART clinics during the establishment period precisely
because they were so well resourced.
There was so much support for training and supplies
in the ART clinic. They never complained because they
had everything they needed. So I could just leave it
and concentrate on other things. Overall In-Charge
HC1.
Weak management of the mostly negative responses
to the removal of ART overtime shifts (e.g. boycotting of
the ART clinics) was one example of in-charges’ gener-
ally weak leadership capacity in this regard. Weak or
absent management of other endemic human resource
management problems include absenteeism and moon-
lighting was also evident in several in-charges’ fatalistic
approach to these issues.
They [the staff] just have their own agenda. There is
nothing I can do; Overall In-Charge, HC3).
The overall in-charge in HC4 was an exception to this
general finding. Presiding over the integration of an initially
stand-alone ART clinic with the outpatient department, he
described some clear improvements in facility-wide admin-
istrative accountability. Specifically, he was able to use the
appointment of a single departmental in-charge for the
newly merged OPD and ART departments, and the con-
solidation of the formerly separate staff rosters, to help re-
duce unexplained staff absenteeism arising from clinicians
and nurses switching between the two departments.When we integrated, we were able to cut out on that
shift switching whereby some senior staff were really
taking advantage. Overall In-Charge, HC4.
Integration also reportedly helped the overall in-charge
to improve expectations for the quality of general out-
patient services through the use of ART standard operat-
ing procedures. The routine measurement and recording
of patient vital signs and provision of patient education,
for example, were re-introduced for OPD clients following
service integration. Notably, although HC2 and HC3 had
also recently integrated OPD and HIV departments, they
retained separate OPD and ART in-charges and few of
these benefits were documented.
Social accountability
In a health service setting, effective mechanisms of social an-
swerability should enable clients to understand and assess
service availability, quality and responsiveness. By enabling
data collection, dissemination and feedback, mechanisms of
social answerability serve to ensure transparency of service
availability and help to justify service quality. Mechanisms of
social enforceability, meanwhile, include ‘voice’ and ‘exit’
sanctions [43]. Voice sanctions may encompass written or
verbal demands made to and about service providers in
one-on-one or group settings, public forums, or via public
and social media. In the context of health service delivery,
exit sanctions refer to patients’ capacity to ‘vote with their
feet’ by attending a different facility. Voice and exit sanctions
do not automatically equate with enforceability, however.
They are examples of mechanisms that may either partially
or wholly compel a stakeholder to act or make a change.
The efficacy of such mechanisms is contingent on the way
they are enacted (e.g. collective or communal ‘voicing’ of a
demand versus individual complaints) as well as a range
of structural conditions including legislative environment
and/or informal or formal power relations [45].
Limited strengthening of mechanisms of social
answerability
In Zambian primary health centres neighbourhood health
committees (NHCs) constitute an important mechanism of
social answerability and enforceability (Figure 2). Elected or
appointed to ensure citizen representation for each facility’s
catchment population, NHCs are made up of 8–12 ‘zone
chairpersons’ who meet monthly at the health centre, and
who preside over smaller zonal committees in between
times. The de jure purpose of the NHCs is to ensure an-
swerability through information exchange and to enable
joint decision-making between providers and the commu-
nity in relation to service priorities. However NHC com-
mittee members in all four facilities in this study listed their
most important duty as supporting and supplementing
health centre services (e.g. child growth clinics, vaccination
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paigns), with little evidence of capacity or opportunity to
hold health centre staff accountable.
Our job, it is to support the clinic [services]. Like during
under-five activities or if they are doing immunizations
in the community. Then we support them and also tell
people about these services. NCH Chair, HC1.
Various factors underpinned the NHC focus on assisting
with service delivery versus ensuring the answerability of
health workers. Lack of human resource capacity within
the health centres meant that professional staff placed sig-
nificant pressure on committee members to provide stop-
gap measures for service delivery.
We really depend on those guys [the NHC]. I don’t know
how we would do our environmental health outreach
and MCH activities because we lack staff. Even with
these volunteers we still lack capacity. EHT, HC4.
More fundamentally, NHC members appeared to lack
information that would enable them to compare de jure
health policies with de facto services. Nor did NHCs re-
ceive any support or training to develop the sorts of com-
munication and advocacy skills necessary to enforce any
breaches in performance.
The standing appointment of the health centre in-charge
to the position of NHC secretary was also important.
Although rationalized in terms of ensuring staff representa-
tion at every NHC meeting, the appointment weakened
committees’ capacity to act as an independent adjudicator
of facility performance, make demands for information or
issue complaints in relation to service responsiveness. In
two of the health centres (HC1, HC2) the overall in-
charges were also responsible for NHC meeting minutes,
wielding significant power over the recording and represen-
tation of issues at future forums.
Critically, the establishment and scale-up of ART clinics
in relative isolation from mainstream clinic operations in
these four sites did little to strengthen the capacity or orien-
tation of NHC members to invoke their nominal authority
as a mechanism of social accountability (Figure 3). Nor did
HIV scale-up activities reinforce the implementation of
other mechanisms of answerability, such as the Ministry-
mandated ‘patient feedback’ boxes. Health centre audits at
the time of study (Jun. – Nov. 2011) found only one of the
four facilities (HC 1) with an observable feedback system,
though this was described by several staff as rarely used.
The mixed impact of HIV scale-up on internal mechanisms
of enforceability
Some positive effects of HIV scale-up on aspects of social
accountability were nevertheless identified. Interviews withhealth workers demonstrated that HIV service scale-up re-
sulted in a substantial shift in the attitude of professional
staff towards HIV-patients. Providers in all four sites clearly
articulated the needs of HIV patients as ‘special’ or ‘different’,
commenting on the need for empathetic and high quality
care when dealing with this group. Some described the
intensive material investment in the ARTclinics as evidence,
in-and-of-itself, of the special nature of this population.
These shifts in attitude strengthened work norms related to
HIV services, a critical internal mechanism of enforceability.
Paradoxically, however, this shift in attitude towards HIV-
patients seemed to exacerbate the perception held by some
providers that non-HIV outpatient clients were less in need
and less deserving of responsive and ethically informed care.
These OPD patients, they are not patients. Generally
speaking twenty five percent in a day are genuine
cases… seventy five percent are not genuine cases […]
they are malingerers. Clinician HC1.Interviewer: Why do OPD patients carry their own file
around the clinic, while HIV patients have their files
delivered to the clinician by a staff member?Clinician HC3: With the HIV files, you need to be
careful of confidentialityInterviewer: Shouldn’t OPD files also be confidential?Clinician HC3: With the OPD files, it’s just like
malaria and cough. So with these guys we don’t
usually encourage confidentiality. There’s no stigma
for OPD patients, but with HIV more care is needed.
Incidental impact on external mechanisms of enforceability
As summarised in Figure 3, providers in all four sites
reported that HIV service scale-up strengthened HIV-
patients’ willingness to make demands about aspects of
their treatment or to request transfers. Providers attributed
this shift to the chronic-care approach of the ART clinics,
which included routine counselling, health education talks
and a standardized approach to service-delivery that helped
HIV-patients understand both their disease and the
processes involved in their treatmentd.In the HIV department there is routine. There is order.
And the patients, they know what to expect and then
they can demand it. Lay Counsellor, HC2.
For ART patients it’s standard, it is being done for every
visit that the patient comes. So the patient is going to be
educated to say: “When I arrive at the clinic I’m going to
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maybe I’ll go for adherence, etc., etc., because that is a
standard and it is being done.” That sinks in the patients’
mind and they expect that to be done. But on the other
side [in OPD] things are not being done properly; there is
no “system” if I may call it. Nurse, NGO Partner.
Both observation and interview data confirmed that HIV-
patients' improved understanding of their treatment and
service environment improved their capacity to use 'voice'
sanctions as they were more confident to demand certain
services (e.g. measurement and recording of vital signs) and
point out or demand redress for what they saw as service
breakdown (e.g. loss of paper medical files). Enforceability
against such demands, however, remained more ad hoc.
Overall production of social accountability generally not
improved
Although these outcomes were positive, providers’
attitudinal shifts and HIV patients’ improved awareness
and health literacy did not substantively improve social
accountability overall within the health centres. Lack of
investment in structures and processes that would enable
and strengthen collective action (such as the NHCs)
meant that strengthened individual capacity to ‘voice’
complaints did not translate into effective mechanisms
of enforceability. Providers’ ongoing perceptions of
being overworked, underpaid and unable to influence the
macro-level factors shaping their work environment,
moreover, continued to be influential in shaping their
service patterns and work norms [24]. Staff in several
facilities (HC3, HC4), for example, expressed a sense of
frustration (rather than pride) when describing patients
who transferred to their facility, even when it implied
superior performance.There are too many patients. There is too much work.
I can’t stop [the patients] but they should just
[go elsewhere]. ART Clinic Nurse, HC3.
The [patients] who come from other catchment areas
should just stay within. They shouldn’t come here.
We can’t cope. ART In-Charge, HC1.
Thus, neither the shift in providers’ internal norms vis-à-vis
the entitlements of HIV patients, nor the improvements in
HIV patients’ capacity to ‘voice’ their needs, was sufficient
to improve social enforceability in the health centres
overall. At the time of study, moreover, providers in the
ART clinics displayed similar work patterns to those in
other departments, including frequent absenteeism and a
‘queue clearing’ approach to patient care.Discussion
This study set out to explore whether, and in what ways,
the process of HIV scale-up influenced key drivers of
service quality and responsiveness in four Zambian health
centres. Specifically, we sought to understand how the
introduction of HIV services influenced the dual domains
of administrative and social accountability, via mechanisms
of answerability and enforceability.
Previous work on the impact of HIV care and treatment
scale-up on frontline services in Zambia by Brugha et al.
pointed to early improvements in the availability of ART
but mixed findings with respect to improvements in the
availability and uptake of other (non-HIV) services. Critic-
ally, the authors point to the need for more explanatory
research to “move beyond correlation studies to analyse
the processes within facilities to understand and explain
such trends” [17].
The findings presented in this paper go some way to
address such research gaps, demonstrating that the early,
resource-intensive investment in the ART clinics contrib-
uted initially to strong administrative answerability within
the ART clinics at all four sites by helping to establish the
material capabilities necessary to deliver and monitor ser-
vice delivery. Simultaneous investment in system ‘software’
via external supervision and professional development
helped to promote transparency around individual and
team performance. In combination with improved data col-
lection and routine monitoring, this investment in system
software also had positive effects on administrative enforce-
ability in the ART clinics, through strengthened provider
motivation and work norms, if not through any overt
improvement in clinic managers’ disciplinary capacity.
Well-resourced ART clinics and the implementation of a
chronic care service model had an incidental albeit
important impact on social accountability in the ART
clinics. A heightened sense of responsibility for delivering
high quality care to HIV patients was evident among
providers in all four facilities, and was linked to providers’
sense of empowerment arising from their well-resourced
service environments and the perception that HIV-patients
were in particular need of care. Such findings highlight the
way normative behaviour – a critical internal mechanism of
accountability – may be strengthened via dynamic inter-
actions between adequate resourcing and robust data sys-
tems on the one hand, and strong leadership focused on
relational aspects (notably trust and communication) of
service delivery, on the other.
Notwithstanding these gains, establishment and scale-up
of HIV services had relatively few positive impacts on the
production of accountability in the wider health centres.
Mechanisms of administrative accountability, including
data collection and performance review mechanisms in
other departments were largely unchanged by the HIV
scale-up processes. Nor did these activities strengthen the
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enforce performance standards, despite placing pressure
on these individuals to manage an increasingly complex
logistical and human resource landscape. In-charges gener-
ally weak handling of the tensions surrounding the introduc-
tion, and subsequent removal, of ART overtime payments
was one example and observations from other settings,
including South Africa, have flagged the need for more
explicit investment in leadership and stewardship to ensure
sustained improvements in quality and responsiveness of
both HIV and other primary-level health services [18]. The
exceptional example of HC4, meanwhile, provides evidence
of how even in generally weak systems, where public sector
service values are eroded or latent, strong leadership plays
an important role in helping to shift service patterns, work
culture and overall performance.
Rifkin [47] argues that social accountability is only truly
present when those affected by decisions or actions have
some type of effective recourse or process to ensure their
needs and concerns are dealt with fairly. In this respect,
substantive and long-term gains in social accountability –
both in the ART clinics and beyond – were elusive. Despite
a positive shift in providers’ attitudes towards HIV-patients,
and strengthened capacity of HIV-patients to invoke ‘voice’
sanctions, the scale-up of HIV services contained no specific
activities designed to address the deeply rooted information
and power asymmetries affecting social answerability and
enforceability more broadly. The gap between NHCs’ de jure
purpose and de facto activities, for example, was unchanged
by the introduction of HIV services and remained heavily
influenced by NHC members’ imperfect understanding of
health centre performance standards and their lack of
authority in facility planning processes.
In the absence of a more coordinated application of
‘voice’ or ‘exit’ sanctions at the meso- and macro-levels,
we also found that the positive but unintended gains in
relation to patients’ capacity to ‘voice’ issues had little
impact on the deeply rooted norms and macro-level deter-
minants of service quality such as chronic human and
other resource shortages.
As Walt [48] notes, health provider behaviour is embed-
ded in the social institutions and power relations of their
working environment. Such uneven power dynamics remain
an unfortunate but notable feature of many LMICs’ health
services [49-52]. Growing experience of programmatic work
and a nascent body of research in the area of social account-
ability highlight potential areas of intervention and system
strengthening in this domain [53,54]. Mechanisms such as
community dialoguing and patient score-cards, in particular,
have been the focus of an increasing number of programs
[55,56]. A recent small-scale evaluation of a ‘citizen voice
and action’ program in Zambia provided local evidence of
the importance of addressing entrenched power dynamics
between patients or communities and facility and Districtlevel health officers through concerted investment in
dialoguing and networking skills on both sides [57].
Influenced by the assumption that front-line or lower-
level health services represent simple or even mechanistic
systems [15,37,58], service interventions, particularly those
planned and financed through global health initiatives, are
often based on the logic of linear causal pathways, which
assume that investment in one area of a health facility will
produce automatic, predictable and positive effects overall.
This assumption is in turn underpinned by a failure to
recognise the complexity of both the interventions them-
selves (with their long and multi-factor causal chain) and
the people-centredness of the target (micro-level) health
systems [59].
One of the implications of failing to engage with the
complexity of micro-level health systems is highlighted by
our finding that administrative accountability in three of
the four ART clinics in this study actually weakened over
time. During the period of HIV service establishment,
NGO and government implementers focused attention on
establishing strong, self-sufficient ART services. With the
focus squarely on emergency scale-up, less consideration
was given to the interaction that these frontline ART ser-
vices would ultimately have with broader health centres.
Inevitably, as the ART clinics began to experience more
structural pressure from increasing patient numbers and
as the distinction between ART and general health centre
staff and systems became more blurred, the service pat-
terns and work norms that shaped providers’ behaviour in
health centres as a whole, started to merge. Structural
conditions – including donor policy shifts that resulted in
the removal of financial incentives, weak GRZ capacity to
meet resource gaps and the poorly implemented transfer
of technical support activities – also contributed to a shift
of ART service patterns and work norms towards those
found in the wider facilities.
Such findings demonstrate how despite some initial
gains in service quality and responsiveness in one specific
service domain, sustained improvements were ultimately
inhibited by the selective nature of the intervention.
Conclusions
The research presented in this paper adds to a small but
important body of work that provides policy-relevant
evidence of the complex nature of micro-level health
systems and the way targeted service interventions have
multiple and often unintended effects on system perform-
ance. Our findings highlight the importance of shifting the
understanding by global health technocrats, national and
sub-national policy makers and implementing officials of
the interaction between targeted interventions and the
health systems in which they are located. To (at worst)
do no harm, and (at best) produce an overall system
strengthening effect, policy makers and implementers of
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cific and strategic consideration to understanding hardware-
software interactions and their relative impact on service
drivers. This requires a re-orientation of disease-specific
interventions away from mechanistic logic-models and
towards realistic assessments of the complex, social and
adaptive nature of health systems at all levels, and highlights
once more the importance of careful planning and adequate
investment in both system hardware and software to achieve
sustained and quality service-delivery at all levels.
Endnotes
aThe transition phase was marked by poor communica-
tion between policy-makers, NGO implementing partners,
and front-line service providers. Underpinned by the lack
of operational planning for what ‘transition’ would mean,
lack of information in the health facilities in Zambia, for ex-
ample, meant that many health workers were either un-
aware that NGO implementing partners no longer had the
funds or the remit to provide technical support, or that
these funds had been redirected to the Ministry of Health.
A perception of being ‘abandoned’ was noted throughout
the data collection period, and similar confusion has been
reported elsewhere [24,29].
bWe acknowledge some conceptual overlap between the
domains of accountability described above, and the role of
trust in health care settings. For the sake of conceptual clar-
ity, however, our focus in this paper lies exclusively with
accountability. Future publications will examine the interac-
tions between the two.
cWe recognise the importance of trust but for the pur-
poses of analytical clarity choose to address this mech-
anism in a separate paper.
dAlthough not explored in this study, it also seems likely
that the public information dissemination, education and
communication campaigns run between 2000 – 2006 in
Zambia (see for example [60,61]) may have helped to im-
proved clients’ general health literacy related to HIV care
and treatment.
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